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Abstract 
There is an ongoing debate whether firm focus creates or destroys shareholder value. Earlier 
literature has shown significant diversification discounts: firms that engage in multiple activities 
are valued less. Various factors are important in the size of the discount, for example cross-
subsidization and agency problems. The extant literature, however, generally focuses on non-
financial firms or traditional banking (cf Laeven and Levine (2007) and Schmid and Walter 
(2006)). Our paper focuses specifically on the valuation of bank-insurance conglomerates. We find 
no universal diversification discount but significant variability. Size, complexity and risk seem to 
be important determinants. 
 
JEL codes: G2, G3, L2 
Key words: financial conglomerates, firm valuation  
 
♣
 De Nederlandsche Bank, Supervisory Policy Division, P.O. Box 98, 1000 AB Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands. Tel.: +31 20 524 2024. Email: i.p.p.van.lelyveld@dnb.nl. 
♦
 Nijmegen School of Management, Radboud University, P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK, Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands. 
∗
 University of Groningen, P.O. Box 800, 9700AV Groningen, The Netherlands. The contents of this 
working paper reflect the opinions of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of De 
Nederlandsche Bank. The authors would like to thank Jack Bekooij for excellent research assistance and 
Lammertjan Dam, John Lewis and participants of the DNB Workshop on Insurance 2007 and CIBIF 2007 
conference for useful comments. 
  1 
1 Introduction 
In this paper we analyze the valuation of the mixed financial conglomerate model on the stock 
market. Are firms that combine banking and insurance within a single institution valued more or 
less than the sum of their constituting parts? The financial conglomerate business model, mixing 
banking and insurance, is not universally applauded. In many countries it is a limited phenomenon, 
oftentimes a mere temporary one as well. During the 1990s, German Allianz took over Dresdner 
bank, ING was created in the Netherland, both Dexia and Fortis in Belgium, and Citigroup in the 
US. These mergers should be seen against the light of continuing consolidation. In the financial 
sector in the EU a total of 935 billion euro M&A activity took place between 1990 and 2003. 1 A 
minority of these mergers were across sectors, although still accounting for 130 billion euro. The 
majority of take-over activity was limited within banking (± 580 billion euro) or within insurance 
(± 225 billion euro). Lately there seems to be a trend towards deconglomerisation. ABN Amro sold 
its insurance leg (limited as it was), Credit Suisse sold Winterthur Italia, and Citigroup sold its 
Travellers insurance subsidiary. 
More broadly, there is an ongoing debate whether a firm’s focus creates or destroys value. Earlier 
literature (Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996)), has shown significant 
diversification discounts: firms that engage in multiple activities are valued less. What drives the 
discount is not clearly established, however, and various factors have been highlighted. For 
instance, Denis, et al. (1997) point to agency problems while Schmid and Walter (2006) highlight 
geographic diversification. An important strand of the literature argues that the same traits that 
induce firms to diversify, also lowers the firm values. This sample selection bias has been tackled 
by Campa and Kedia (2002), Villalonga (2004) and Lamont and Polk (2001). 
The extant literature generally focuses on non-financial firms. Furthermore, the few papers that do 
analyse financial firms (cf Laeven and Levine (2007) and Schmid and Walter (2006)) mainly focus 
on banking. Branching across sectoral boundaries into insurance (and vice versa) is only discussed 
as an aside. Our paper will focus specifically on the valuation of bank-insurance conglomerates. 
Our contribution to the debate is that this is the first analysis of the valuation of cross-sectoral 
groups, combining banking and insurance. Is there a premium or a discount and, if so, what drives 
this discount? We will investigate three possible explanations: size, mixedness and risk. The set up 
of the paper is straightforward. Section 2 will discuss the relevant literature. We will then discuss 
the data used and offer some descriptive statistics in section 3. Sections 4 and 5 turn to the 
empirical analysis of the key value measures and its main determinants. Section 6 concludes. 
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2 Theory 
The costs and benefits of diversification and firm focus have been discussed extensively. The 
earlier literature was quite positive, pointing to economies of scale and access to profitable business 
lines (Chandler (1977)), debt capacity and debt tax shields (Lewellen (1971)) and the creation of 
internal capital markets, leading to increased investment efficiency (Stein (1997)). These earlier 
papers were followed by less optimistic theories, highlighting the dark side of diversification. 
Insiders may for instance expand the range of corporate activities for private gain (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)) or diversification might intensify agency problems between insiders and small 
stockholders (Stulz (1990)). It might also influence the volume of activities (Scharfstein and Stein 
(2000)), it might lead to bargaining problems (Rajan, et al. (2000)) or it might result in bureaucratic 
rigidity (Shin and Stulz (1998)). 
Given these theoretical reasons to love or hate corporate diversification, there is a sizable empirical 
literature estimating the discount. One of the first of these being an article by Berger and Ofek 
(1995). The authors argue that corporate diversification will lead to inefficient investment because 
of cross-subsidisation between business lines. Using SIC-coded activities, they find a discount of 
13 percent to 15 percent. Lins and Servaes (1999), however, find more mixed evidence for the 
discount using a sample of firms operating in Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Overall, 
however, most authors find a sizable discount. 
Most of the traditional literature focuses on the effects of diversification on cash flows and 
consequent value of the overall firm. Recently, however, some alternative explanations of the 
equity price discount for conglomerate firms have been suggested. Lamont and Polk (2001) 
examine the possibility that diversified firms are faced with required future asset returns that are 
higher than those of specialized firms. While the range of possible explanations for differential 
expected returns also includes risk, taxes, and liquidity, in a financial conglomerate setting it is 
often attributed to mispricing by irrational investors. Financial conglomerates are complex, 
financial products opaque, and so investors and analysts have above-average difficulty in valuing 
such firms (see for instance the discussion in Hadlock, et al. (1999)).  
Mansi and Reeb (2002) point to the classical conflict of interest between shareholders and 
debtholders when it comes to the determination of the risk profile of the firm. Corporate 
diversification leads to risk reduction and a lower default premium, which increases debtholder 
value. In a contingent claims framework, however, shareholder value is the call option on the value 
of the firm exercised in states where the value of the assets is greater than the debt claim (i.e. the 
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residual value). The value of this option decreases as a firm decreases its risk, so that in effect value 
is transferred from shareholders to debtholders. 
A radically different view is that it is not corporate diversification that causes the discount but that 
already discounted firms tend to diversify away from industries experiencing difficulties into more 
promising industries (reverse causality). Using various econometric techniques, Campa and Kedia 
(2002), Villalonga (2004), Whited (2001), Fluck and Lynch (1999), and Lamont and Polk (2001) 
all find that the discount can be at least partly explained by selection bias, endogeneity problems, 
and measurement error. A similar argument is made by Maksimovic and Phillips (2002): less 
productive firms tend to diversify, but diversity is not causing the discount. 
Most of the literature uses data for non-financial firms. More specifically, financials are generally 
excluded as for instance their leverage is of such a different magnitude. Exceptions are Laeven and 
Levine (2007) and Schmid and Walter (2006). The former authors find strong evidence of a 
conglomerate discount using a sample of 836 banks from 43 different countries. They assign the 
balance sheet data, taken from BankScope, to different types of activities and compare the bank’s 
Tobin´s q to a benchmark of focused firms. Laeven and Levine attribute the destruction of value to 
agency problems with the conglomerate structure. They also conclude that the size of the discount 
is such that it most certainly would wipe out any economies of scope these firms might have. 
Schmid and Walter (2006) limit their sample to the US but include all types of financial 
intermediaries.2 They find a substantial and persistent discount. The authors argue that it is driven 
by diversification, not by troubled firms diversifying away into more promising areas. For the very 
largest of the firms in their sample, Schmid and Walter find a substantial premium, pointing to the 
existence of “too big to fail” guarantees.3 
3 Data and descriptive statistics 
A first decision needed before we can construct a data set is what definition to use for financial 
conglomerates. An obvious definition of a financial conglomerate is a group of firms that 
predominantly deal with finance (that is, banks). In financial regulation, however, it has acquired a 
slightly different meaning: a financial conglomerate has come to mean a group of firms that engage 
in financial activities that have been kept separate, by law and regulation, for many years in many 
countries. Combinations of some of these activities —banking, securities trading, and insurance—
are still forbidden in many countries. The Group of Ten gives the following definition: “any group 
of companies under common control whose exclusive or predominant activities consist of 
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providing significant services in at least two different financial sectors (banking, securities, and 
insurance).”4 The European Commission has proposed a more precise definition, in two steps: a 
group only qualifies as a financial conglomerate if (a) more than 50 percent of group activities are 
financial and if (b) the shares of the banking sector (including security activities) and the insurance 
sector in the total of the financial activities are within the range 10–90 percent. In addition, if the 
minority share has a balance sheet larger than €6 billion, the group also qualifies as a financial 
conglomerate. We start our analysis below with the 45 largest financial conglomerates that have 
been published by the EU in 2006. Where in the remainder of our empirical analysis we will focus 
on the impact of diversification on market value (sections 4 and beyond), we will filter our 
conglomerate sample for criteria a) and b), but ignore the second part.5 This, together with data 
availability, results in a list with 29 institutions, shown in Annex 1. 
To determine whether conglomerates are valued sufficiently, we also need data for peers solely 
active in either banking or insurance. To this end we have selected the 45 largest listed banks 
(based on balance sheet size, 2005), and the 45 largest insurers (based on Gross Premiums written, 
2005). For all three groups, banks, insurers and conglomerates we take balance sheet data from the 
BankScope and ISIS databases, for banks and insurers respectively. For the conglomerates we 
chose the database with the best cover. 
An issue is the treatment of IFRS reporting. Towards the end of the data set there are more and 
more institutions that report based on the new IFRS guidelines instead of, usually, local GAAP. 
Visual inspection does not show big jumps as firms move from one reporting framework to the 
other. We have chosen to use IFRS reports as soon as they are available.6 
In addition to balance sheet data, we also need data on the market valuation of the firms in our 
sample. Daily equity data (price index, market value and returns) for the period 1990 to 2005 where 
taken from Datastream. Finally, we need daily risk free interest rates to construct Sharpe ratio´s. 
These come in two flavours: first, we have 10 year interest rates swaps. Second, we constructed a 
dataset with the yield on 10 year government bonds. Both these series are taken from Datastream 
for the period 1990 to 2005. 
 
3
 Schmid and Walter (2006) also analyse the effects of geographic diversification which we will not discuss 
as our focus is on diversification between banking and insurance. 
4
 Group of Ten (2001). 
5
 That is, we ignore the financial stability induced requirement that even if the smallest sector is relatively 
unimportant within the firm, it might still be systemically important. Our interest solely lies with the former. 
6
 To capture any undue effects of the change in reporting framework we will use an IFRS dummy, taking on 
the value 1 for IFRS reports and 0 otherwise. As a sensitivity test we estimated the empirical section using 
local GAAP reports as long as possible. The results are qualitatively similar. 
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We determined the percentage of insurance activity (in comparison to banking) based on the annual 
balance sheet data. In some cases this information was supplemented or confirmed with 
information from for instance websites. The sector shares were determined based on relative 
balance sheet size (waTA) and on relative sales (waSA), where we took Total Revenue and Gross 
Premiums Written as measures for sales in the banking and insurance sector, respectively. 
Although these measures focus on alternative aspects of the relative importance of sectors, their 
correlation is high (0.87). 
To give a broad brush characterisation of our data set we show some descriptives in Table 1 below. 
Looking at the size of the institutions included, we see that the financial conglomerates are 
relatively large compared to the included peers. This is natural as firms, both banks and insurers, 
tend to pick up business across sectors as they grow. Large firms will thus tend to fit our 
conglomerate criteria. 
 
Table 1 Summary statistics: total assets, 1995-2006, Billions € 
Sector Mean Median Min Max 
Banking 96 38 0.9 992 
Insurance 50 14 0.4 374 
Fico 280 116 3 1170 
Total 105 32 0.4 1170 
Source: BankScope, ISIS 
 
How have the conglomerates performed over the years, especially in comparison to their peers? 
Figure 1 shows the indexed daily stock prices since 1995 of the 135 institutions in our basic 
sample.7 Each of the panes (ie banking, insurance and conglomerate) shows the mean and the 
median of the indexed price movement. Figure 1 shows that there is material co-movement 
between the stock price movements of banks, insurers and conglomerates. For all three types there 
is a steady rise until the second half of the nineties, followed by several years of stabilisation. The 
worldwide stock market crash shortly after the Millennium is apparent, although a remarkable 
recovery follows lasting to the end of the sample period. 
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 The selection of the 45 listed financial conglomerates was based on the list of the “EU Mixed technical 
group on supervision of financial conglomerates” as compiled on 13th July 2006. However, this list is based 
on the EU-definition and is in two parts: the degree of cross-sector diversification and systemic relevance. As 
our focus is on the effect of diversification on market valuation we will slightly amend the sample and only 
consider those observations where conglomerates would qualify based on their degree of diversification 
instead of financial stability impact. 
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Figure 1 Price movements for bank, insurers and conglomerates, 1995-2006 
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In addition to the stock price movement, investors are also interested in the volatility of particular 
shares. Figure 2 shows the average volatility within rolling windows of 265 trading days (ie. one 
year). For the banking sector, it shows a clear increase in investor uncertainty right before the turn 
of the century, a period where banks faced the Asia/Russia crisis, the LTCM default, and the 
bursting of the ICT bubble. For insurers, we see a lower level of volatility, clearly linked to the 
longer term focus of for instance life insurance. It seems, however, that the period of relatively high 
volatility persists somewhat longer. In particular, it looks like it continues until well after the 
creeping stock market crash at the start of the century. This is not surprising in the light of insurers’ 
relatively high dependence on investment returns at the time.8 Financial conglomerates seem to 
combine developments in banking and insurance.  
Figure 2 The volatility of bank, insurers and conglomerates, 1995-2006 
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Source: Datastream 
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 Most insurers in the EU have reduced their exposure to markets risks significantly since 2002 by drastically 
reducing their equity portfolios. See CEIOPS (2005) and CEIOPS (2006). 
Average Median 
  7 
Following numerous authors (Berger and Ofek (1995), Lamont and Polk (2001)), our main 
measure of interest will be the benchmark market-to-book value of financial conglomerates as 
imputed from the weighted combination of their stand alone valuations, as given by: 
( )∑ ∑∑
= =
−
=



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        (1) 
with wa as the weight for each sector with k being either TA (Total Assets) or SA (Sales) and n=2 
(banking and insurance); Ai stands for assets, Qi for the market-to-book value of each single sector 
firm, and N=45, respectively. Thus, for each conglomerate in our sample, we use the relative 
weight of banking compared to insurance within the conglomerate (measured by assets or sales) to 
combine the average market-to-book valuation of stand alone banks and insurers. We also compute 
an alternative specification of (1) where we compute the median instead of the average market-to-
book value for each of the two sectors (changing the part within the brackets). These valuation 
benchmarks will then be compared to actual conglomerate market-to-book valuation, and 
subsequently tested for the various theories formulated to explain diversification benefits or 
discounts such as riskiness, liquidity, mispricing. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics. Within each pane we show the summary statistics of the asset 
weighed mean differences of the natural logs of Q and both Q  and MEDQ , using either the average 
(Q ) or median ( MEDQ ) value for the stand alones, and either assets or sales weights for the 
construction of the benchmark valuations.9  
 
Table 2 The relative valuation of financial conglomerates, based on market value / total assets 
  Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Q Asset weights (waTA) 
for q  and medq  
     
 qq −  -0.0007 0.0008 0.0612 -0.2034 0.2608 
 
medqq −  -0.0010 0.0011 0.0662 -0.1846 0.3271 
 Sales Weights (waSA) 
for q  and medq  
     
 qq −  0.0044 0.0014 0.0686 -0.2417 0.2316 
 
medqq −  0.0039 0.0007 0.0722 -0.2221 0.2489 
The mean value of the relative discount measures is weighed by total assets. q , q  and medq are natural logs of 
Q, Q and MEDQ . The total number of included observations is 142. 
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 Note that as this is a non-linear transformation it implies that the group means shown are not 
straightforward weighed combinations. 
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What do the results tell us? Previous research on non-financials firms tends to show clear and 
significant diversification discounts. For financial conglomerates, most of the existing literature has 
found more limited discounts. For our sample of 45 EU financial conglomerates we find no 
evidence of a structural diversification discount. The average asset-weighed excess value is close to 
zero and statistically insignificantly different from it. It is much more interesting to note that there 
is sizable variation around these averages. As averages are sensitive to outliers the median might be 
a better measure of the central effect; all the relevant statistics appear to be comparably 
insignificant, however. Closer examination of the underlying data reveals that 52% of the 
conglomerates show a premium while in 48% of the cases a discount materialises. 
 
4 Estimation approach and methodology 
The large variation around the mean of the mean (and median) peers indicates that although on 
average conglomerates are valued neutrally, this does not hold universally. This led us to 
investigate whether we could determine specific groups or characteristics that have a significant 
influence on any discount (or premium). A natural candidate for such a discerning characteristic is 
size as a proxy for the complexity of the firm. Another such proxy would be the degree to which 
conglomerates are truly mixed. Finally, the associated risk profile might also be a candidate. We 
will discuss each of these in turn. 
The first discerning characteristic we will discuss is size, proxying for the complexity of the firm. 
In Figure 3 we have plotted the size of the conglomerates included against qq − , our measure of 
relative valuation. In addition we have plotted a regression line, telling us that there seems to be a 
negative relationship: while small conglomerates witness a premium on average, larger 
conglomerates tend to face a discount. 
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Figure 3 Size versus the conglomerate discount, 1997-2006 
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The R2 of the red line is 0.17. 
The second candidate is the degree of mixedness. If, for example, a conglomerate has only 11% in 
banking it is likely that market participants will view this conglomerate as an insurer with some 
“other business”. Valuation should in that case be in line with that of its insurance peers. A fully 
mixed conglomerate (50%-50%) might however be seen as a firm that is difficult to manage and to 
analyse. If this hypothesis holds, we would expect a symmetric relationship sloping down to the 
50%-50%-point. Figure 4 shows such a line fitted to our data, where the horizontal axis depicts the 
percentage of assets tied up in insurance. The fit is not particularly strong or robust for either the 
balance sheet (waTA) or the sales (waSA) measure of sector size. We experimented with different 
functional forms but these do not materially improve the fit. 
Figure 4 “Mixedness” versus the conglomerate discount, 1997-2006 
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Estimated under the restriction that there should be a symmetrical linear relation 
around the 50% mixedness (measured by waTA). Total assets were used as weigths 
in the regression. The R2 of the red line is 0.03. 
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The final candidate for explaining the variation in the discount is the riskiness of the firms, as a 
possible measure for value transfers between shareholders and debtholders. In Figure 5 we plot the 
standard deviation against qq − , suggesting indeed that higher riskiness leads to slightly higher 
stock market valuation on average. 
Figure 5 Risk versus the conglomerate discount, 1997-2006 
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Risk is measured as the standard deviation of equity returns. The R2 of the red line is 0.02. 
 
An underlying assumption in the panel analysis in the next section is that the data are stationary. 
We tested this assumption for all the right-hand side variables using a number of tests. The overall 
conclusion is that the variables are neither all stationary (Hadri (2000) test) nor are all series non-
stationary (Pesaran (2003) test). The Taylor and Sarno (1998) test indicates that the series are I(0). 
However, as the time dimension of our sample is limited, the discriminating power of the tests is 
limited as well. Furthermore, many of the tests require the panel to be balanced. Forcing this 
requirement implies dropping many of our conglomerates. 
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5 Empirical results 
We start our multivariate analysis with an analysis in the vein of Berger and Ofek (1995), Lins and 
Servaes (1999) and Mansi and Reeb (2002). These authors all estimate a relation between corporate 
diversification and excess value. We estimate the following panel model, both with fixed and 
random effects. 
it
p
nl
itll
n
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+=+=
+++=
1
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1
,1  
 
where 
• α1 is an intercept term and βk,l are coefficient vectors 
• EV is excess value, estimated by qq − or medqq −  
• PRIORSit is a matrix of variables to test our theoretical priors 
• CONTROLSit is a matrix of characteristics related to conglomerate i 
• itε  is the idiosyncratic error, ( )2it 0, IID~ εσε  
• i=1,..., N where N is the number of conglomerates in the sample 
• t=1,..., Ti where Ti is the number of years in the sample for conglomerate i 
 
Our PRIORS cover size, time, the degree of mixedness, and riskiness of the firm. One important 
starting point is that more complex firms might be valued less, an effect that pops up in two 
manifestations. Our first prior relates to investors’ fear that the “dark side” of diversification 
(inefficient cross subsidization etc, Berger and Ofek (1995)) will erase any economies of scale and 
scope. We proxy this by using the size of the firm (the natural log of total assets) and expect a 
negative sign (larger discounts). The second prior is based on the argument that financial 
conglomerates are inherently difficult to value, so that investors require a higher rate of return 
Lamont and Polk (2001). After all, the hybrid firm is a relatively recent phenomenon and does not 
represent the clear banking or insurance business model that investors traditionally understand and 
relate to Hadlock, et al. (1999). As both sectors within conglomerate firms become more balanced 
in size, opacity increases and this ambiguity is likely to erode value. We therefore expect the 
discount to reach its maximum when the share of the smallest sector approaches its maximum at 
50% (a negative sign on MIXED).10 As we would expect analysts to learn and better understand 
conglomerates over time, we expect a positive sign for the TIME trend also included. The third prior 
has to do with the riskiness of the firm. As for instance argued in Mansi and Reeb (2002), 
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 Note that the MIXED variable employed here differs from the one depicted in Figure 4. 
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decreasing the riskiness of a firm through diversification will lead to a transfer of value from 
equity- to debtholders. Equityholders reap the benefits in case of large positive realisations but are 
protected by their limited liability if bad states of the world materialise. An increase in risk, 
measured by either the yearly standard deviation of daily returns (RISK) or the LEVERAGE of the firm 
can then be expected to diminish the discount (positive coefficient).  
A first firm-specific CONTROL we include, is relative profitability measured by both return on assets 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE). We would expect a positive sign here. Second, we include a 
dummy variable with the value 1 in years that we use the annual report under the new IFRS 
reporting rules. 
Table 3 Excess value estimation qq −  
 (3.1) 
FE 
(3.2) 
RE 
(3.3) 
FE 
(3.4) 
RE 
(3.5) 
FE 
(3.6) 
RE 
(3.7) 
FE 
(3.8) 
RE 
         
PRIORS         
SIZE -0.6708 -0.4444 -0.6725 -0.4483 -0.6710 -0.4438 -0.6726 -0.4479 
 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
 
        
TIME 0.0867 0.0706 0.0865 0.0703 0.0876 0.0711 0.0874 0.0709 
 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
MIXED -0.9328 -0.4765 -0.9097 -0.4756     
 
(0.06)* (0.29) (0.06)* (0.31)     
MIXED 2     -28.543 -13.017 -27.746 -12.942 
 
    (0.03)** (0.31) (0.04)** (0.31) 
 
        
RISK 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 
 
(0.03)** (0.01)*** (0.03)** (0.01)*** (0.02)** (0.01)*** (0.03)** (0.01)*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0498 0.0487 0.0467 0.0470 0.0514 0.0489 0.0485 0.0473 
 
(0.04)** (0.03)** (0.07)* (0.06)* (0.04)** (0.05)** (0.06)* (0.06)* 
 
        
CONTROLS         
ROE   -0.0277 -0.0221   -0.0249 -0.0212 
 
  (0.47) (0.57)   (0.52) (0.59) 
ROA -0.0148 -0.0012   -0.0130 -0.0004   
 
(0.75) (0.98)   (0.78) (0.99)   
IFRS -0.0529 -0.1025 -0.0637 -0.1158 -0.0568 -0.1061 -0.0667 -0.1192 
 
(0.53) (0.22) (0.46) (0.16) (0.50) (0.20) (0.43) (0.15) 
Constant 76.982 51.246 76.982 51.246 76.799 51.020 77.183 51.735 
 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Observations 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 
Number of id 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
R-squared 0.28  0.28  0.28  0.28  
Hausman 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
p values in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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All in all, the results in Table 3 are quite encouraging. The results for qq −  are for both fixed and 
random effects. We also estimated the models with medqq − , but the results are very similar.
11
 Our 
first prior, that larger conglomerates have more opportunities for inefficient cross-subsidization and 
therefore face a larger discount, is strongly confirmed. Our second prior, that the discount would be 
reduced as conglomerates become less opaque, is also borne out by the data, but somewhat less 
unambiguously. The TIME trend is significantly positive, suggesting that investors may indeed have 
increased their appraisal of financial conglomerates over time. The MIXED coefficient has the proper 
sign but is only marginally significant for the fixed-effects panels. Efforts to test a nonlinear 
inclusion (MIXED SQUARED) yielded more robust results for the fixed-effects but not for the random-
effects model (columns 5-8). The third prior based on the risk shifting argument also seems to hold. 
An increase in risk, measured by either the yearly standard deviation of daily returns (RISK) or the 
LEVERAGE of a firm positively affects the excess value. Thus, as risks decrease through 
diversification within a conglomerate, value shifts from equity- to debtholders. 
Both the relative return on assets and the relative return on equity remain insignificant throughout 
all specifications. The IFRS dummy is also not significant, indicating that our results are robust to 
the change in reporting framework. This is corroborated by broadly similar estimates using an 
alternative construction of our data set where we use local GAAP reports for as long as they are 
available and only switch to IFRS if these are no longer available.  
A possible criticism of our approach is that the peers chosen are not the relevant ones. In 
constructing the benchmark Q  and MEDQ  we originally used all the peer banks and insurance firms 
available in our EU sample. It might however be the case that valuation is more regionally 
determined. The average effect would be filtered out by incorporating panel (or country) specific 
fixed effects as in our regressions. Comparing the firm specific valuation with banks and insurance 
firms that are geographically close is another approach. We therefore computed the benchmark Q  
measures for a limited number of banks and insurers that are closest.12 Replicating Tables 2 and 3 
in this manner lead to materially similar results (available upon request). 
 
 
11
 Note that comparing our results with similar analyses for non-financial firms can be problematic. Tobin´s q 
is measured by dividing the present value of future cash flows by the replacement cost of a firm´s tangible 
assets. In a profitable, non-financial firm the replacements cost would expected to be lower than the net 
present value of cash flows. Financial firms, however, typically have monetary assets whose replacement 
values will be in line with the net present value of future cash flows. Tobin´s q for financial firms could thus 
be expected to be lower (if assets are valued on a mark to market basis). 
12
 We started by determining the number of banks (insurers) in the home country. If these did not tally up to 
six we proceeded and included the nearest country and so forth until we had at least six peer banks (insurers). 
The home countries of the peers can thus differ for the banking peers and the insurance peers. 
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6 Conclusion 
We have examined the valuation of financial conglomerates, ie firms that are active in both 
banking and insurance. Contrasting previous studies we find no universal discount, but we do 
observe considerable variability around the mean (and/or median) valuation. In a multivariate 
setting we also report a positive time trend. It might thus be the case that stock markets have only 
recently begun to better understand and appreciate financial conglomerates. 
We discussed three possible explanations for valuation discounts that the existing literature has put 
forth: inefficient cross-subsidization, opacity of the hybrid conglomerate model, and value shifting 
between shareholders and debtholders. Our first prior, that larger conglomerates have more 
opportunities for inefficient cross-subsidization and therefore face a larger discount, is confirmed 
for our sample of EU mixed financial conglomerates. Our second prior, that the opacity of financial 
conglomerates would be the main source of observable discounts, is not unambiguously borne out 
by the data. Our third prior, that value shifts from equity- to debtholders as risk decreases through 
diversification, does seem to hold.  
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Annex 1  List of firms in sample 
Financial conglomerates 
Country Name Ave. 
waTA 
Ave. 
waSA 
 Country Name Ave. 
waTA 
Ave. 
waSA 
BE Fortis 0.14 0.31  IE Irish Life & Permanent 
Plc  
0.37 0.41 
CH Credit Suisse Group 0.29 0.31  IT Banca Carige SpA 0.09 0.08 
DE Allianz 
Aktiengesellschaft  
0.68 0.95  IT Banca Intesa SpA 0.05 0.04 
DE AMB Generali Holding 
AG  
0.52 0.80  IT Gruppo Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena 
0.06 0.08 
DE Wüstenrot & 
Württembergische 
0.48 0.55  IT Mediolanum 0.66 0.78 
DK Alm. Brand A/S 0.63 0.50  IT San Paolo-IMI 0.04 0.02 
DK Danske Bank A/S 0.20 0.24  NL ING Groep NV 0.33 0.62 
DK Sampo Plc 0.53 0.45  NL SNS Reaal Groep NV 0.16 0.25 
ES Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentaria SA 
0.03 0.04  NO DnB Nor ASA 0.16 0.09 
ES Banco Santander 
Central Hispano - Group 
0.04 0.04  NO Storebrand Group - 
Storebrand ASA 
0.77 0.51 
FR Crédit Agricole - Crédit 
Agricole Group 
0.12 0.11  SE Nordea Bank AB 0.08 0.11 
GB Lloyds TSB Group Plc 0.21 0.07  SE Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken AB 
0.07 0.12 
GB Old Mutual Plc  0.60 0.68  SE Svenska Handelsbanken 0.10 0.35 
GB  HBOS Plc 0.11 0.07      
The full list was published by the EU Mixed Technical Group on Supervision of Financial Conglomerates on July 13, 2006. See footnote 
5 for our selection criteria. The reported weights wa (total assets and sales, respectively) refer to the average share of insurance in the 
conglomerate. 
Banks 
Country Bank Country Bank 
AT Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG GR Alpha Bank AE 
AT Oesterreichische Volksbanken AG GR EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA 
AT Raiffeisen International Bank-Holding AG GR Piraeus Bank SA 
CH Banque Cantonale Vaudoise IE Allied Irish Banks plc 
CY Bank of Cyprus Group-Bank of Cyprus Public 
Company Limited 
IE Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Plc 
DE Aareal Bank AG IE Depfa Bank Plc 
DE Berlin Hyp-Berlin-Hannoverschen Hypothekenbank 
AG 
IS Kaupthing Bank hf 
DE Commerzbank AG IT Banca CR Firenze SpA-Cassa di Risparmio di 
Firenze SpA 
DE Deutsche Bank AG IT Banca Lombarda e Piemontese SpA 
DE Deutsche Hypothekenbank (Actien-Gesellschaft) IT Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA - BNL 
DE Deutsche Postbank AG IT Banca popolare dell'Emilia Romagna 
DE Eurohypo AG IT Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL 
DE Hypo Real Estate Holding AG IT Banca Popolare Italiana-Banca Popolare Italiana - 
Banca Popolare di Lodi 
DE IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG IT Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 
DE LBB Holding AG-Landesbank Berlin Holding AG IT Capitalia SpA 
ES Banco Espanol de Crédito SA, BANESTO IT Credito Emiliano SpA 
ES Banco Popular Espanol SA IT IFI - Instituto Finanziario Industriale SpA 
ES Bankinter SA NL ABN Amro Holding NV 
FI OKO Pankki Oyj-OKO Bank plc PT Banco BPI SA 
FR Natexis Banques Populaires PT Millennium bcp-Banco Comercial Português, SA 
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Country Bank Country Bank 
GB Alliance & Leicester Plc SE Swedbank AB 
GB Bradford & Bingley Plc   
GB Northern Rock Plc   
 
Insurance firms 
Country Insurance firm Country Insurance firm 
AT Wiener Stadtische Allgemeine Versicherung AG  GB Amlin plc  
CH Bâloise-Holding  GB Aviva Plc  
CH Converium Holding Limited GB Beazley Group Plc  
CH Helvetia Patria Holding  GB Brit Insurance Holdings Plc  
CH Schweizerische National VAG GB Chaucer Holdings Plc  
CH Swiss Life Holding  GB Henderson Group Plc 
CH Vaudoise Assurances Holding SA GB Hiscox Plc  
DE DBV Winterthur Holding AG  GB Legal & General Group plc  
DE ERGO Versicherungsgruppe AG  GB Resolution Plc  
DE Gerling Beteiligung Gmbh GB Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Group plc  
DE Hannover Rückversicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft  GB Wellington Underwriting Plc  
DE Kölnische Rückversicherungs Gesellschaft AG  GR 'The Ethniki' Hellenic General Ins. Company SA 
DE Munich Re Group  IT Alleanza Assicurazioni SpA  
DE Nürnberger Beteiligungs-Aktiengsellschaft  IT Compagnia Assicuratrice Unipol SpA 
DK Codan A/S  IT Fondiaria - SAI SpA 
DK Topdanmark A/S  IT Generali Assicurazioni SpA  
DK Tryg Vesta AS  IT Milano Assicurazioni SpA  
ES Corporación Mapfre  IT Premafin Finanziaria SpA  
ES Grupo Catalana Occidente SA  IT Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA - RAS  
FR AGF (Group)  IT Società Cattolica di Assicurazione coop. Arl  
FR CNP Assurances  IT Toro Assicurazioni SpA  
FR Euler Hermes  NL Aegon NV 
FR SCOR SA    
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